This paper uses quantile regressions to document the increase in hedge funds' Value-at-Risk (VaR) conditional on other styles being under distress and (predictable) spill-over e ects to the banking sector. This increase of conditional VaR is due to an increase in bivariate dependencies in times of stress. We identify six common factors that explain the tail dependence across hedge fund styles. This set of risk factors also explains a large part of hedge funds' expected returns, which unlike the Value-at-Risk, a ect ows into and out of hedge funds style.
Introduction
Our nancial architecture underwent a dramatic transformation in the last two decades with hedge funds taking on an ever increasing role. Hedge funds' assets under management { after adjusting for leverage { are now comparable to the total size of US investment banks' balance sheets and represent nearly 25% of GDP. The emergence of hedge funds as key nancial intermediaries is intimately linked to this continuous process of nancial innovation. In today's markets the risk of individual assets is repackaged and tranched into di erent components using derivatives. With this ever increasing tradability and securitization of nancial assets such as loan portfolios, corporate debt, credit card payables, mortgages etc., hedge funds now take on risks that have traditionally been kept on banks' balance sheets.
The collapse of Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998 made clear that the failure of a hedge fund can threaten the stability of the nancial system. The opaqueness of hedge funds' exposures and lack of regulatory oversight further raises the question whether hedge funds increase the likelihood of systemic crisis. In a liquidity spiral, initial losses in some asset class lead to higher margins, rapid asset sales, and reduction in mark-to-market wealth, which in turn leads to additional losses and potential spillovers into other asset classes (Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2007) ).
1 Banks and particularly prime brokers, who have credit risk exposure to hedge funds, suffer potentially large losses if many hedge funds experience distress at the same time.
Therefore from a nancial stability point of view, it is important to understand which hedge fund styles tend to experience simultaneous large losses and to what extent the banking sector is shielded from hedge fund distress.
In this paper, we use quantile regression, which naturally yield our measure of tail risk { the Value-at-Risk (VaR) { to empirically study the interdependencies between di erent hedge fund styles at times of crisis, and analyze the spillover e ects to the banking system. We present ve main results: (i) our new tail risk dependence measure, CoVaR { de ned as hedge funds' VaR conditional on the fact that some other hedge fund style is in distress { is signi cantly higher than the (unconditional) VaR, (ii) \tail dependence" sensitivities are higher in times of distress, (iii) low returns of xed income hedge funds predict a higher Value-at-Risk for investment banks in the subsequent months. To document this (delayed) spill-over e ect to the banking sector, we introduce a \Granger-tail causality test". Furthermore, (iv) we identify six risk factors that explain the tail dependence across hedge fund styles and the banking sector and argue that (v) these risk factors also explain a large part of hedge funds' expected returns.
We also nd { consistent with existing literature { that past returns a ect capital ows across strategies and over time, but { surprisingly { the Value-at-Risk does not a ect capital ows. Hedge fund managers thus have incentives to load on tail risk for two reasons: it increases both the managers' incentive fee (percentage of the fund's pro t) and the management fee (percentage of assets under management).
Our paper contributes to the growing literature that sheds light on the link between hedge funds and the risk of a systemic crisis. Boyson, Stahel, and Stulz (2006) also document contagion across hedge fund styles using logit regressions on daily and monthly returns. However, they do not nd evidence of contagion between hedge fund returns and equity, xed income and foreign exchange returns. In contrast, we show that our pricing factors explain the increase in comovement among hedge fund styles in times of stress. Chan, Getmansky, Haas, and Lo (2006) document an increase in correlation across hedge funds, especially prior to the LTCM crisis and after 2003. Adrian (2007) points out that the increase in correlation since 2003 is due to a reduction in volatility { a phenomenon that occurred across many nancial assets { rather than an increase in covariance. Asness, Krail, and Liew (2001) and Agarwal and Naik (2004) document that hedge funds load on tail risk in order to boost their CAPM-. Agarwal and Naik (2004) capture the tail exposure of equity hedge funds with non-linear market factors that take the shape of out-of-the-money put options. Patton (2007) develops several \neutrality tests" including a test for tail and VaR neutrality and nds that many so-called market neutral funds are in fact not market neutral. Bali, Gokcan, and Liang (2007) and Liang and Park (2007) nd that hedge funds that take on high left-tail risk outperform funds with less risk exposure. In addition, there is a large and growing number of papers that explain average returns of hedge funds using asset pricing factors (see e.g. Fung and Hsieh (2001, 2002, 2003) , Hasanhodzic and Lo (2007) ). Our approach is di erent in the sense that we study factors that explain the co-dependence across the tails of di erent hedge fund styles.
The paper is organized in ve sections. In Section 2, we study the pairwise relationships between the returns to di erent hedge fund styles, and the relationships between hedge fund styles and other nancial intermediaries. In Section 3, we estimate a risk factor model for the hedge fund returns. We document that six commonly traded risk factors explain hedge fund returns well, and that they particularly explain the increase of CoVaR relative to unconditional VaR. In Section 4, we study the incentives of hedge funds to take on tail risk. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
q-Sensitivities and CoVaR
In this section, we document that pairwise dependence of the returns to hedge fund styles is signi cantly higher in times of stress. As a result, the Values-at-Risk of fund styles conditional on other funds is higher in times of stress than in normal times. We also study the relation between hedge fund returns and the returns to other nancial institutions in times of stress, both contemporaneously and in a predictive sense.
Hedge Fund Return Data
Hedge funds are private investment partnerships that are largely unregulated. Studying hedge funds is more challenging than the analysis of regulated nancial institutions such as mutual funds, banks, or insurance companies, as only very limited data on hedge funds is made available through regulatory lings. Consequently, most studies of hedge funds thus rely on self-reported return data. 2 We follow this approach and use the hedge fund style indices by Credit Suisse/Tremont.
There are several papers that compare the self-reported returns of di erent vendors (see e.g. Agarwal and Naik (2005) ), and some research compares the return characteristics of hedge fund indices with the returns of individual funds (Malkiel and Saha (2005) ). The literature also investigates biases such as survivorship bias (Brown, Goetzmann, and Ibbotson (1999) and Liang (2000)), termination and self-selection bias (Ackermann, McEnally, and Ravenscraft (1999) ), back lling bias, and illiquidity bias (Asness, Krail, and Liew (2001) and Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) ). We take from this literature that hedge fund return indices do not constitute ideal sources of data, but that their study is useful, and the best that is available. In addition, there is some evidence that the Credit Suisse/Tremont indices appear to be the least a ected by various biases (Malkiel and Saha (2005) ).
[ Table 1] Summary statistics for January 1994 -June 2006 of the monthly excess returns of the overall hedge fund index and the ten style indices are given in Table 1 (Panel A). These styles have been extensively described in the literature (see Agarwal and Naik (2005) for a survey), and characterizations can also be found on the Credit Suisse/Tremont website (www.hedgeindex.com). We report the hedge fund returns in the order of their weights in the overall index as of December 2006. These weights are also reported in the third to last column of Panel A in Table 1 . We also report the returns of three additional nancial institutions in Panel B: commercial banks, investment banks, insurance companies. In addition, we report the summary statistics of the return CRSP market excess return, which we sometimes interpret as a proxy to a well diversi ed mutual fund. The commercial bank and insurance company returns are from the 49 industry portfolios of Ken French's website (http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data library.html).
The investment bank returns are the value weighted returns of Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs, Bear Sterns, and Lehman Brothers from CRSP. Note that traditional nancial intermediaries are traded and hence their returns { unlike the accounting returns used in hedge fund indices { also re ect expected changes in goodwill and reputation.
The Sharpe ratio of the hedge fund index (0.27 monthly) is nearly twice as high as the Sharpe ratio of the market index (0.15 monthly). It is also higher than the Sharpe ratio of the other nancial institutions (0.20 for investment banks, 0.21 for commercial banks, and 0.18 for insurance companies). There is a wide disparity of Sharpe ratios across styles: equity market neutral achieves the highest Sharpe ratio (0.60), while dedicated short has a negative Sharpe ratio (-0.09). Sharpe ratios and the December 2006 sectoral weights do not appear to be highly correlated (the correlation is in fact 15% and statistically insigni cant), but average returns over the 1994-2006 period are highly and signi cantly correlated with the December 2006 weights (the correlation is 56%). Since hedge funds invest part of their wealth in highly illiquid instruments with stale or \managed" prices, they can smooth their returns and manipulate Sharpe ratios (see e.g. Asness, Krail, and Liew (2001) and Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) ).
The hedge fund index has less negative skewness than the market return (-0.03 versus -0.79), but higher kurtosis (5.55 versus 4.93). There is also large variation of skewness and kurtosis across styles. Styles with higher leverage generally appear to have more negative skewness. Normality is rejected on the basis of either skewness or kurtosis for all styles, as well as the other nancial institutions and the market return.
Thus, consistent with previous ndings, the returns to hedge funds have both skewed and fat tailed returns relative to normality.
The most negative monthly returns are lower for the overall hedge fund index than for the market or other nancial institutions. This nding is also con rmed by looking at the 5% percentile: it is -2.58% monthly for the hedge fund index, versus -6.41% for the market. The nding that the left tail of hedge fund returns has excess skewness and kurtosis relative to a normal distribution, but lower skewness and kurtosis than the market is consistent with Brunnermeier and Nagel's (2004) nding that hedge funds are good market timers.
Quantile Regressions
We make use of quantile regressions to study the dependence of hedge fund returns in times of crisis. Quantile regressions were developed by Koenker and Bassett (1978) and Bassett and Koenker (1978) . 
Note that the usual de nition of VaR is the negative of our de nition. Thus the predicted value from the quantile regression of returns of style i on style j gives the Value-at-Risk conditional on R j . In principle, this regression could be extended to allow for non-linearities by introducing higher order dependence of returns to style i as a function of returns to style j.
De nition 1 We denote the CoVaR ij , the VaR of style i conditional on the (unconditional) VaR of style j by: While quantile regressions are regularly used in many applied elds of economics, its application to nance has up to now been rather limited. Notable exceptions are econometric papers like Bassett and Chen (2001) and Chernozhukov and Umantsev (2001) as well as the working papers by Barnes and Hughes (2002) and Ma and Pohlman (2005) . This is surprising to us, since the 5% quantile of the return directly provides an estimate of the (negative of) Value-at-Risk, a widely used risk-measure.
q-Sensitivities
Average hedge fund sensitivities increase in times of stress. This can be seen from Table 2 , where we report the q-sensitivities across the hedge funds styles (as well as the q-sensitivities with other nancial intermediaries) for the q = 50% quantile and the q = 5% quantile (Panels A and B, respectively). These q-sensitivities are the coecients ij q of Equation (1). The average sensitivity for the bivariate median regressions (Equation (1) with q = 50%) across all possible combinations of the ten hedge fund styles is 32%, while it is 53% for the sensitivities in the 5% quantile regressions. Instead of assigning the same weight to each style, we also report the average sensitivities weighted by the December 2006 value times leverage, and nd averages of 33% for the 50% sensitivities (median regressions), versus 56% for the 5% sensitivities. Average sensitivities are thus more than two thirds higher in times of stress (as proxied by the 5% sensitivities) compared to normal times (as proxied by the 50% sensitivities).
[ Table 2 ]
We can also see that the q-sensitivities between the hedge fund styles and other nancial intermediaries increases in the left tails of the return distributions. In particular, the average exposures between the ten hedge fund styles, and the other nancial intermediaries is 42% for the median regression, and 70% for the 5% quantile regressions. is 7% in the median regression, but increases to 26% in the 5% regression. Conversely, the sensitivity of xed income arbitrage with respect to global macro is 105% in normal times, but increases to 114% in times of stress.
The increase in sensitivities among hedge fund styles in times of stress has previously been noted by Boyson, Stahel, and Stulz (2006) . Boyson, Stahel, and Stulz (2006) do not use quantile regressions, but produce dummies for the worst 5% of returns of the left hand side return in an OLS regression, and refer to this increase in dependencies as \contagion".
Increases in CoVaRs
As a consequence of the increase in average sensitivities among hedge fund styles, the CoVaRs increase. This can be seen in [ Table 3] As one would expect, these e ects are not totally symmetric. For example, xed income funds and multi-strategy funds have roughly the same (unconditional) VaR of 1:51, 1:33 respectively. However, when multi-strategy funds are in distress, the VaR of xed income funds is 52% higher, while in periods of distress for xed-income funds, the VaR of multi-strategy is increased by roughly 77%.
Forecasting Distress -Tail Granger Causality Test
So far we focused on contemporaneous relationship between returns. Next, we incorporate quantile regressions into a Granger causality test to determine whether hedge fund returns predict distress in other nancial intermediaries (in the sense of an increased
Value-at-Risk), and vice versa. More speci cally, we \quantile regress"
and test whether ij q for q = 5% are signi cantly di erent from zero.
[ Table 4 ]
Our ndings, presented in Table 4 , show that multi-strategy, xed-income, convertible arbitrage and dedicated short funds predict a statistically signi cantly higher
Value-at-Risk in the investment banking sector. The converse and a link to the commercial banking sector is not statistically signi cant, which is most likely due the fact that at the beginning of our data sample 1994, the interdependence between hedge funds and commercial banks was weaker than it is today. As commercial banks are entering more and more into the investment banking business (whose trading resembles to a large extent that of hedge funds), we would expect that the \tail Granger causality" that we document for investment banks might also show up for commercial banks.
Identifying Tail Factors
Having established that Value-at-Risk of hedge fund style i or of banks increases when the return of style j is in distress, in this section we identify factors that explain this \tail dependence". We argue that a factor structure explains this tail dependence, if the CoVaR after o oading the risk associated with these factors roughly coincides with the unconditional o oaded VaR, that is, if the excess tail dependence for residuals is much lower compared to the dependence of the raw returns. We rst outline our six factors, before creating o oaded returns. We distinguish between two o oaded returns: (i) the residuals of an OLS regression whose conditional expectation is independent of the realization of the factor returns and (ii) the residuals of a 5% quantile regression, whose 5% VaR does not depend on the factor returns.
Tail Factors -Description and Data
We select six factors that capture the increase in co-movement across hedge fund styles'
VaRs. All of them have solid theoretical foundations, capturing certain aspects of risks and hence, are not simply due to data mining. They are also liquid and easily tradable.
We restrict ourselves to a small set of six risk factors to avoid over tting the data. Our factors are:
(i) CRSP market return in excess to the 3-month bill rate re ecting the equity market risk. The Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) market index is a broad benchmark re ecting the value weighted of all publicly traded securities;
(ii) VIX straddle excess return to capture the implied future volatility in the stock market. This implied volatility index is available on Chicago Board Options Exchange's website. To get a tradable excess return series we calculate the straddle return of a hypothetical at-the-money straddle position that is based on the VIX implied volatility and substract the 3-month bill rate.
(iii) the variance swap return to capture the associated risk premium for risky shifts in volatility. The variance swap contract pays o the di erence between the realized variance over the coming months and its delivery price at the beginning of the month.
Since the delivery price is not commonly observable over our whole sample period, we use { as is common practice { the VIX squared normalized to 21 trading days, i.e.
(VIX*21/360) 2 . The realization of the index variance is computed from daily S&P 500 index data for each month. Note also since the initial price of the swap contract is zero, returns are automatically excess returns.
(iv) a short term \liquidity spread", de ned as the di erence between the 1-month repo rate and the 1-month bill rate measures the short-term counterparty liquidity risk.
We use the 1-month general collateral repo rate that is available on Bloomberg, and obtain the 1-month Treasury rate from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
In addition we consider the following two xed-income factors that are known to be indicators in forecasting the business cycle and also predict excess stock returns (Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991), Campbell (1987), and Fama and French (1989) ).
(v) the slope of the yield curve, measured by the yield-spread between the 10-year
Treasury rate and the 3-months bill rate.
(vi) the credit spread between BAA rated bonds and the Treasury rate (with same maturity of 10 years).
The last three factors are from the Federal Reserve Board's H.15 release. All data are monthly from 01:1994 to 07:2007.
The literature has studied related factors. Boyson, Stahel, and Stulz (2006) use the S&P500, Russell 3000, change in VIX, FRB dollar index, Lehman US bond index and the 3-Month Bill return as factors, but { unlike our study { they do not nd a link between these factors and contagion. Agarwal and Naik (2004) also focus on tail risk.
In addition to out of the money put and call market factors they use the Russell 3000,
MSCI excluding US (bonds), MSCI emerging markets, HML, SMB, MOM, Salomon
Government and corporate bonds, Salomon world government bonds, Lehman high yield, Federal Reserve trade weighted dollar index, GS commodity index and change in default spread. Factors used in Fung and Hsieh (1997 , 2002 , 2003 di er depending on the hedge fund style they analyze. An innovative feature of their factor structure is to incorporate lookback options factors that are intended to capture momentum e ects. We opted not to include this factor since restricted ourselves only to highly liquid factors. Fung, Hsieh, Naik, and Ramadorai (2008) try to understand performance of fund of fund managers. They employ the S&P 500 index as factor; a small minus big factor; the excess returns on portfolios of lookback straddle options on currencies, commodities and bonds; the yield spread { our factor (v) { and the credit spread { our factor (vi). Finally, Chan, Getmansky, Haas, and Lo (2006) use the S&P 500 total return, bank equity return index, the rst di erence in the 6-months LIBOR, the return on the U.S. Dollar spot rate, the return to a gold spot price index, the Dow Jones / Lehman Brothers bond index, Dow-Jones large cap -small cap index, Dow
Jones value minus growth index, the KDP high yield minus U.S. 1-year Treasury yield, the 10-year Swap / 6-month Libor spread, and the change in CBOE's VIX implied volatility index. Bondarenko (2004) introduced the Variance swap contract as a new factor.
In our robustness section we show whether our results change for these alternative factor speci cations .
O -loaded Returns
After having speci ed our factors, we study next how o oading the tail risk that is associated with these a ects the returns. We consider two di erent ways to construct o oaded returns. As an intermediate step we rst look at \OLS o oaded returns" which are the residual of the OLS regression of raw returns on our six factors. Then, we look at the \quantile o oaded returns" we are primarily interested in, the residuals of the 5%-quantile regression of raw returns on our six factors. Note that VaR of the quantile o oaded returns is independent of the realization of the factors.
Panel A of Table 6 repeats the raw returns listed in Table 1 to facilitate the comparison with the quantile o oaded returns reported in Panel B.
[ Table 6 ]
The following di erences between Panel A and B stand out: First, o oading the risk associated with our factors signi cantly reduces the average mean return and Sharpe ratio if one weights each strategy by its size. The reduction is small if fund style are equally weighted. However, this is primarily driven by the overrepresentation of dedicated short-specialists { a hedge fund style that comprises only 1 percent of the fund size universe { since their quantile o oading returns is relatively high. Looking at individual styles, one notes that some o -leaded mean returns and Sharpe ratio even enter negative territory. Our model's s are not very large { and they are by de nition the same for the raw returns and o oaded returns. The CAPM-, using CRSP excess market returns, also drops notably after o oading the risk associated with our factors.
The average CAPM declines from .35 to .11. Note that we take the simple average of s instead of the average of the absolute amounts of s, since it is not easy to short a hedge fund style. Finally, note that hedge fund and bank returns are not normally distributed. Most styles and the index exhibit negative skewness and positive excess kurtosis. The Royston's (1991) tests for normality con rms this. It give the p-values whether skewness is zero and kurtosis is three { the values for the normal distribution.
The kernel densities of Figure 1 reveal that o oading reduces the fat left tail, while it doesn't a ect the right tail much.
[ Figure 1] 
q-Sensitivities of O -loaded Returns
As we did for the raw returns in Section 2, we replicate the bivariate 5%-quantile regressions for the o oaded returns. In other words, we quantile regress the o oaded returns of style i on the o oaded returns of style j. Table 8 reports [ Table 7 ]
Ultimately, we are interested in whether our six factors capture the tail dependence among hedge funds' raw returns. They do so, if the bivariate-sensitivities of the ofoaded returns in Table 8 are signi cantly lower than the ones for the raw returns reported in Table 2 , Panel B in Section 2. The average bivariate 5%-sensitivity decreases from 53% to 34% for the OLS o oaded returns and to 20% for the quantile o oaded returns. The decline is even more pronounced for the banking and insurance sector. The average cosensitivity drops from 70% to 25%, 14% respectively.
Another striking feature of Table 7 is that there are many negative entries in the Commercial bank row. That is, the o oaded VaR of commercial banks seems to improve as returns of various, especially the large, hedge fund styles worsen. This nding is surprising at rst sight but is consistent with \reintermediation phenomenon"
caused by ight to quality. As investors shed risky assets in times of crisis, cash pours into commercial banks and hence, banks' funding liquidity improves. Hence, they are natural liquidity providers at these times (Gatev and Strahan (2006)), which seems to boost their o oaded returns. However, their overall returns still su er since they are also adversely a ected by our risk factors. The coe cients for insurance companies point in a similar direction, but they di er in magnitude.
CoVaRs of O -loaded Returns
q-Sensitivities give a good sense about the directional impact of conditioning, but they do not allow a good comparison across more and less volatile hedge fund styles. The percentage increase in CoVaR over the unconditional VaR provides the right normalization and hence more information on the extent to which our factors reduce the tail dependence. Table 8 [ Table 8 ]
Our factors capture the co-dependence among hedge fund styles and other nancial intermediaries if the percentage increase in CoVaRs for the o oaded returns is markedly smaller than the one reported for raw returns in Table 3 . Indeed, the average percentage increase due to conditioning on other fund styles being in trouble is only 19.59% of the -3.02% (Panel A), 9.02% of -3.04% (Panel B). Recall without o oading the tail dependence is much higher { conditioning on some other fund style being in distress on average increased the Value-at-Risk on average by 38.15% (Table 3) . Taking the weighted average instead of the simple average, the drop is from 30.57% for raw returns (Table 3) Also note that the hedge fund strategy Equity Market Neutral (EMN) has the lowest unconditional VaR, which explains why the percentage increase in CoVaR is high after conditioning on certain hedge fund styles.
Incentives to Load on Tail Risk
Section 2 documents that tail risk of hedge funds and other nancial institutions increases during times of distress. Section 3 identi es tradable factors that explain a large part of this increase in tail risk. We next ask whether hedge funds have an incentive to o oad this tail risk.
Cost of o oading factor risks
Hedge fund managers, investors, banks, or fund of fund managers can o oad the risk associated with these factors without incurring large trading costs since our factors tradable and highly liquid. Consequently o oading is -neutral within our model.
However, the comparison of Panels A and B of Table 6 show that o oading signi cantly reduces the weighted average monthly return from .26 to 0.08. Stated di erently, a large extent of hedge funds' outperformance relative to the market index is a direct result of their loading on these \tail" factors, especially the variance swap factor. In short, there appears to be a risk-return trade-o between returns and conditional Value-at-Risk in hedge fund returns.
Flow analysis
If reducing sensitivity to these \tail risk factors" substantially lowers hedge funds' expected return, the question arises whether hedge fund managers have an incentive to do so. A typical hedge fund manager receives a performance fee of 20% of the realized pro ts plus 2% of the value of assets under management. Hence, limiting his risk-sensitivity to these (high-return) factors lowers his expected compensation except if it leads to signi cant in ows into his fund. We study these ows and nd that ows are sensitive to past monthly and annual returns or past (annual rolling) Sharpe ratios, but not to the hedge funds' VaR or the standard deviation of its returns. The standard deviation is calculated with an annual rolling window, while the VaR is computed as the predicted value from a 5% quantile regression on the six pricing factors with a minimum of 24 months of data.
[ Table 9 ]
The lack of sensitivity of fund ow with respect to two risk measures { standard deviation and VaR { gives the fund manager no incentive to o oad the risks associated with our factors. This suggests that investors either expect hedge fund managers to take on this risk or investors are naive and hedge fund managers take advantage of this fact.
Robustness

Alternative measures of dependency
The comparison of q-sensitivities from the 5%-and 50%-quantile regressions of Table   2 can be interpreted as a comparison of sensitivities across states of the world. Table 2 shows that average sensitivities are higher in bad times (the average 5% quantile sensitivity is 52%) than in normal times (the average 50%-quantile sensitivity is 32%).
In Figure 2 , we plot the average sensitivities across the hedge fund styles for all quantiles between 5% and 95% for total returns, OLS o oaded returns, and 5% o oaded returns.
The plot shows that the sensitivities across quantiles is relatively at for the 5%-o oaded returns. In contrast, average sensitivities are sharply decreasing along the quantiles for the total returns, and are also decreasing for the OLS o oaded returns.
[ Figure 2 ]
Instead of looking at sensitivities across states of the world, we can also investigate the evolution of sensitivities over time. To do so, we estimate a multivariate BEKK-ARCH(12) model, and extract the evolution of covariances across the strategies over time. We plot the average of the covariances across the ten strategies in Figure 3 .
[ Figure 3 ]
The covariances for the 5%-o oaded returns are clearly less volatile than for the total returns. In particular, estimated average covariances spiked during the LTCM crisis in the third quarter of 1998, and in January 2000. In contrast, the average covariances of 5%-o oaded returns increased much less during those volatile times.
Alternative measures of tail risk
Value-at-Risk { our main measure of tail risk { is only one possible characterization of tail risk. Many alternative measures have been proposed. First of all, Value-at-Risk at lower quantiles can be used. Second, other measures of tail risk can be used. A particularly appealing measure of tail risk that has been proposed in the literature Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and Heath (1999) is the expected shortfall. It is de ned as the average loss below the VaR. In order to make sure that our results are robust to this measure, we computed the expected shortfall of returns as the average CoVaR for 1%, 2%, 3%, 4%, and 5%, and report the results in Table 10 .
[ Table 10 ]
By comparing the two panels, we see that the unconditional expected shortfall is -3.99% for total returns of hedge funds, and -3.51% for the 5% o oaded returns. The increase of expected shortfall conditional on the other strategies is 28% higher for total returns, and only 5.94% higher for the o oaded returns.
Alternative hedge fund data
There are several providers of hedge fund indices that use di erent hedge funds and di erent methodologies to compute style indices. Two alternative data providers are Hedge Fund Research (HFR, at www.hedgefundresearch.com), and Morningstar/Altvest (at www.altvest.com). Tables 11 and 12 report the CoVaRs for these two alternative databases.
[ 
A Appendix
This appendix is a short introduction to quantile regressions in the context of a linear factor model. Suppose that excess returns R t have the following (linear) factor structure:
where X t is a vector of risk factors. Factors are assumed to be excess returns. The error term " t is assumed to be i.i.d. with zero mean and unit variance and is independent of X t so that E [" t jX t ] = 0. Our returns are generated by a process of the \location-scale" family, so that both the conditional expected return E [R t jX t ] = 0 + X t 1 and the conditional volatility V ol t 1 [R t jX t ] = ( 2 + X t 3 ) depend on a set of factors. The coe cients 0 and 1 can be estimated consistently via OLS:
We denote the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of " by F " ("), and the inverse cdf by F 1 " (q) for percentile q. It follows immediately that the inverse cdf of R t is:
where
with quantiles q 2 (0; 1). We also call F 1 Rt (qjX t ) the conditional quantile function and denote it by Q Rt (qjX t ). From the de nition of VaR:
follows directly that
the q-VaR in returns conditional on X t coincides with conditional quantile function Q Rt (qjX t ). Typically, we are interested in values of q close to 0, or particularly q = 1%.
Note that by multiplying the (absolute value of the) VaR in return space the by hedge fund capitalization gives the VaR in terms of dollars.
We can estimate the quantile function via quantile regressions:
See Koenker and Bassett (1978) . Review Koenker and Bassett (1978) and Chernozhukov and Umantsev (2001).
Remark 1 Note that:
recovered from the quantile function by integrating over the quantiles.
The di erence between the quantile coe cients and the OLS coe cients is:
So estimation of any two quantiles q and q 0 allows identi cation of 2 and 3 . Koenker, R., and G. W. Bassett (1978) : \Regression Quantiles," Econometrica, 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total Returns 5% Offloaded Returns 
CoVaR percent increase
This table reports the percentage increase of the five percent Value-at-Risk for the returns of the left column conditional on the fifth percentile of the returns of the top row relative to the unconditional 5% Value-at-Risk (reported in the first column). The Value-at-Risk is computed from the five percent pair wise quantile regressions (the slopes of these regressions are reported in Table 2 Table 3 , but for the offloaded returns (as described in the caption of 
Alpha
This table reports results of panel regressions over time and across strategies with time and strategy fixed effects. The left hand side variables are monthly flows relative to total flows in and out of the hedge fund sector. The right hand side variables are 1) past monthly returns, 2) past annual returns, 3) the annual rolling alpha, 4) the annual rolling Sharpe ratio, 5) the annual rolling standard deviation and 6) the expanding window six factor VaR computed as the predicted value from a 5% quantile regression on the six pricing factors with a minimum of 24 months of data (in sample for the first 24 months). This table reports the CoVaRs as in Tables 3 and 8 , but with Indices from Altvest.
